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Abstract 
In today’s world, organizations are constantly being challenged by the fast changing economic 
environment in which the need to remain competitive is the key to ultimate survival. In the 
downstream oil sector, these challenges are real, on-going and refineries are constantly adapting 
and evolving to ensure that they continue to operate responsibly, effectively, efficiently and 
minimize loss to avoid those economic realities such as closure. To remain in business, the 
downstream oil sector is looking toward and relying more on the use of improved technology 
and the support of the individual organization’s internal management systems.  
The outcome of such economic realities is creating a work environment that is becoming more 
complex to navigate and the human component is increasingly being identified as a key risk 
element that need to be effectively managed to be—or remain—competitive.  
There have been many incident analyses conducted that have improved our understanding of 
how human factors (HF: Chapanis, 1996; Salvendy, 2012) have contributed to major process 
safety events in the downstream oil sector (e.g., HSE, 1997; Kletz, 2009; US CSB, 2007). Some 
of the HF elements identified by these analyses relate to organization culture, human reliability 
and performance, work structures, practices and behaviors, and operating philosophy (reactive or 
proactive) to name a few.  
The Abnormal Situation Management Consortium (ASMC)1 has initiated a number of research 
studies for process related industries (Bullemer & Laberge, 2010, 2011; Bullemer & Reising, 
2014; Laberge, Bullemer, & Whitlow, 2008). The aim of these studies is to improve the 
effectiveness and interaction between technology, system and people within the operating 
environment during abnormal and emergency situations.  
An early ASMC article, captured the challenges that operations groups have to deal with on a 
daily basis and their impacts to effectively manage abnormal events (Bullemer, & Nimmo, 
1998). The substance of the article is perhaps more relevant today as to when it was written due 
to continual effects from major process safety events, increased technological capabilities, 
increased risk & environmental requirements, further centralization of console operation, 
separation of work teams and workforce rationalization within the downstream oil industry.  
Over the past 29 years, this author has personally experienced his share of normal, abnormal and 
emergency events in the refinery operations environment, having served in various roles from 
field operator, to console operator, shift team leader, day operation specialist, and operations area 
superintendent. On reflection, most operation groups are still challenged when it comes to 
managing abnormal events. The main challenge being the organization’s ability to provide and 
maintain the required knowledge and skills needed to effectively operate and manage abnormal 
events as a collaborative work group. While most organizations have improved their training 
support systems, the majority of these efforts have focused on unit-based, individual-role 
competencies rather than multiple-unit, team-role competencies or collaborations, which are 
essential during abnormal events.  
The following is an excerpt (italics) from the article “Tackle Abnormal Situation Management 
with Better Training” (Bullemer & Nimmo, 1998):  
Effective training to handle abnormal situations requires more than high-fidelity simulation-
based training or individual role based training strategies. The operations task is typically a 
collaborative activity involving other operational team members, as well as people from other 
functional groups. Effective training should include dealing with conflicts about goals, 
negotiating resources and constraints, and handling the ways in which individual decisions can 
propagate effects to other people and processes. Hence, training should avoid oversimplifying 
interactions among tasks, communication constraints, or complexity due to human limitations 
and possibilities for error.  
The body of this document will specifically focus on a tool designed to capture those 
collaborative activities, the operation team’s goals, workload and interaction activities during 
abnormal events. The document will exhibit an approach utilizing Scenario-based Risk 
Assessment (SBRA) methodology in order to capture and then examine those tasks and activities 
that support the teams goal during such events. 
1 Introduction 
This Scenario-based Risk Assessment (SBRA) tool for abnormal events is a qualitative process, 
derived from business process mapping techniques (Rummler & Brache, 1995), specifically 
                                                      
1 The Abnormal Situation Management (ASM) Consortium is a group of leading companies, human factor specialist and 
universities involved with process industries that jointly invest in research and development to create knowledge, tools, and products 
designed to prevent, detect, and mitigate abnormal situation that affect process safety in the control operations environment. 
designed to capture those time-imperative activities, tasks, and interactions that individual team 
members perform in a collaborative manner during abnormal process events. The methodology 
is a basic task analysis process of that identifies various aspects of successfully addressing the 
abnormal process event, such as but not limited to: 
 the number of individuals needed to perform the tasks 
 the time needed to complete the tasks 
 the location and frequency of the task 
Or conversely, if there may not be enough time to  
 detect and diagnose the problem 
 perform two or more nearly-simultaneous actions, etc.  
Moreover, potential hazards are identified for each task, including the potential loss initiators 
caused by the hazard and a simple risk assessment is performed. The final stage is to identify 
and/or develop any mitigating strategies, where these mitigation strategies can be further 
reviewed outside the intent of this process.  
The described methodology may also be used to help sites define a minimum staffing level 
required for abnormal event management or used to cover other operational situations that do not 
necessarily lead to a full-plant shutdown. 
There a several guiding principles that underpin this particular SBRA tool for abnormal event(s) 
that need to be understood and applied to ensure a successful, value-added outcome. 
The guiding principles—which are in no specific order of importance are—as follow:  
 Establish a clear understanding of what constitutes an “abnormal event” including 
“abnormal event management” 
 Establish a clear understanding of the operations team goals during the scenario  
 Establish a clear understanding of the abnormal event time line (i.e., what constitutes the 
end of the scenario, e.g., safe controllable condition, ‘safe park’ or full unit re-start)  
 Ensure appropriate operations subject matter expert (SME) representation (input) from 
across functional groups such as the different operation shift teams, role disciplines (e.g., 
operations supervisor, process specialist, console operator, field operator) and experience 
levels  
 Conduct the process in a workshop setting facilitated by an experienced SBRA facilitator 
with knowledge or experience of operational abnormal events and abnormal event 
management strategies 
 Facilitator must remain process-driven not outcome-orientated  
 A separate workshop session conducted for each operations team’s “span of control” 
(typically characterized by the console operator positions’ span of control).  
To ensure that the SBRA tool for abnormal event(s) guiding principles are clearly understood 
and consistently applied the following definitions and information is provided. 
Abnormal event (ASMC definition2): 
 A disturbance or series of disturbances in a process that cause plant operations to 
deviate from their normal operating state. 
 The nature of the abnormal situation may be of minimal or catastrophic consequence. It 
is the job of the operations team to identify the cause of the situation and execute 
compensatory or corrective actions in a timely and efficient manner. 
 A disturbance may cause a reduction in production; in more serious cases it may 
endanger human life. 
 Abnormal situations extend, develop, and change over time in the dynamic process 
control environments increasing the complexity of the intervention requirements. 
Abnormal event management (“Encyclopedia of Industrial Chemistry” definition):  
 Abnormal event management (AEM) involves the timely detection of an abnormal event, 
diagnosing its casual origins and then taking appropriate supervisory control decisions 
and actions to bring the process back to a controlled, safe-operating state. 
 Also known as Abnormal situation management (ASM) or Abnormal condition 
management (ACM)  
It is important to understand that determining the abnormal event timeline is a critical aspect for 
this SBRA process for abnormal event(s) to be effective. Capturing actions and activities after 
the abnormal event is considered back in a controlled, safe-operating state may lead to a 
misunderstanding of the team’s goal, actions or effective resourcing considerations. Once the 
process is back in a controlled, safe-operating condition, subsequent actions should be 
considered as follow-up actions such that they are required to return the process back to a normal 
(pre-abnormal event) state or prepare the process or equipment for maintenance intervention. 
These follow-up actions, which could involve calling in personnel to assist and which are 
typically performed under a more structured situation, may still be driven by time- or resource-
considerations, nevertheless the abnormal process event no longer exists. 
Gaining an understanding of how operations teams learn, interact and maintain situation 
awareness as a team is another essential requirement for this process to be beneficial. Bullemer 
and Nimmo (1998) point out that operations teams tend to informally share knowledge via ‘war 
stories’, there is a challenge in maintaining expertise for the ‘rare event’, and organizations have 
historically relied on each team member implicitly knowing what everyone else is supposed to be 
doing during an abnormal event.  
Bullemer and Reising (2013) identified the risks attributed to situation awareness issues either as 
an individual or as a team and their resultant root cause manifestations in major process 
incidents. The paper describes the differences between individual situation awareness and team 
situation awareness and the need to develop and maintain effective shared situation awareness 
particularly when a situation changes from a normal state, to an abnormal and emergency state or 
condition. Effective shared situation awareness relies heavily on establishing a high degree of 
individual awareness, continually sharing that individual awareness within the team context to 
establish common goals, specific roles and role interdependence. 
                                                      
2 Refer to ASMC website 















The following is a list of benefits that this SBRA tool for abnormal event(s) is designed to 
deliver along with some key challenges that an organization may confront: 
Benefits:  
 Capture and share individual knowledge/experiences of abnormal and emergency 
event(s) 
 Establish a shared understanding of goals, roles, responsibilities, and risks during 
different abnormal events  
 Identify operations resource requirements 
 Identify hazards or potential risks and develop mitigation strategies 
 Build team competencies and task interdependence 
 Proactively establish team goals 
 Verify and validate existing plant emergency procedure and/or work practices 
 Establish span-of-control (multi-plant) priorities, e.g. prioritize the order in which 
furnaces are shut-down across a single console operator’s span-of-control during certain 
abnormal events 
 Integrate learnings into training program e.g. incorporate the SBRA tool for abnormal 
event(s) outcomes into abnormal/emergency response exercises 
 Identify potentially different goals and response strategies across shift teams  
Challenges: 
 Releasing operation personal to participate 
 Ensuring active participation 
 Maintaining the workshop intent & boundaries 
 Allocation of resources 
 Ensuring a balanced representation, e.g., between roles and functions, levels of 
experience, across disciplines 
 Resolving differing opinions on the preferred goal or response strategy  
2 Scenario-based Risk Assessment (SBRA) Process for Abnormal Event(s) 
To support the operations team during an abnormal event, this methodology documents the 
subjective resources, the time and workload requirement of each console and field operator 
involved during the analyzed process upsets using a scenario-based task analysis. Scenarios 
analyzed may require extensive operator action, may be particular difficult to execute, or may 
carry critical consequences if not performed flawlessly. The analysis involves facilitating a group 
of operations subject matter experts (SMEs), including console and field operators, supervisors, 
and engineers, through the scenario to identify critical aspects of successfully completing the 
scenario tasks in a workshop setting. An activity sequence, documenting each role’s activity, is 
developed for each scenario, coordinated via a subjective timeline across the roles involved, as 
part of the workshop session.  Each activity sequence is then assessed for risks, such as the time 
needed to complete the task, the number of individuals needed, the location and frequency of the 
task, whether or not there is enough time to detect and diagnose a problem, whether or not there 
is enough time to perform two or more nearly-simultaneous actions, and so on.  Where risks are 
identified, potential mitigation strategies are also identified for further study. 
Because the SBRA is conducted in a workshop setting, with operations SMEs associated to the 
process area span(s)-of-control analyzed, the methodology makes several critical assumptions for 
the purpose of completing the SBRA for any given scenario. Specifically, the SBRA does not 
account for ‘perfect storm’ scenarios where personnel, safety-instrumented systems (SISs), or 
other safe guards simultaneously fail to perform the appropriate actions. To that end, the 
following assumptions are made, to avoid ‘infinite loops’ and ‘infinite what-if’ permutations that 
might otherwise arise:  
 Individuals expected to respond in the upset or emergency scenario are fully trained and 
qualified, even if they have not personally experienced the specific scenario themselves, 
and therefore would be expected to have the knowledge and competency to respond 
accordingly, in an accurate and timely manner  
 Any safety-instrumented system (SIS) in place – and other automation and process 
equipment for that matter used in responding to the initiating event in the scenario – 
performs as designed and intended;  
 The onset of the scenario has a clearly defined initiating event, even if that event is an 
alarm indication either in the field or at the console  
 The process conditions and equipment availability are stated up front (e.g., reflux drum 
level is within normal range with typical operating inventory; the main bottoms pump is 
in primary service with spare pump in hot stand-by)  
 The scenario involves only one ‘event’; that is, there are not multiple failures 
simultaneously occurring, such as a reactor temperature excursion and simultaneously 
power failure in the unit  
To ensure that each workshop session can be efficiently managed within a set timeframe 
(normally 8-hour sessions), aim to cover at least 4 - 6 scenarios for each span of control. 
Scenarios are typically solicited in advance of the workshop. Scenarios can be fires, spills, 
releases, equipment failure, unexpected workload increase, and so on. 
The list below is an example of scenarios identified for a Hydrotreater unit (HTU), where the 
bold, italicized scenarios were prioritized by the SMEs for the analysis in the workshop for this 
particular refinery. 
 Loss of HTU feed  
 Loss of gas compressor 
 Partial power loss 
 Flange fires on high temp/pressure vapor 
 Large release of liquid hydrocarbon – e.g. valve packing and pump seals 
 Separators overpressure 
 Furnace tube failure 
The list below is an example of scenarios identified for a Fluid Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU), 
where the bold, italicized scenarios were prioritized by the SMEs for analysis at a different 
refinery. 
 Flow reversals between reactor-regenerator 
 Main air blower trip 
 Loss of hydraulic oil pressure (e.g. pump failure, control element failure etc ) 
 Loss of instrument air 
 Loss of 2700kpa steam (usually together with 1000kpa) 
 Total power failure – including emergency power  
 Partial loss of main air blower 
 Loss of saltwater cooling (partial)  
 Fractionator bottoms pump leak (corrosion)/loss of Frac bottoms oil  
 Control system (DCS) failure  
 Loss of top reflux flow  
 Loss of 1000kpa steam due to weather 
 Steam trap failed on transmitter; valve shut & cuts feed  
 Both O2 analyzers fail and led to a carbon build up within the regenerator 
 Partial power failure  
 Exchanger failure (with the fire)  
 Low suction pressure on the feed pump 
 Control oil failure on compressor(s)  
 Gas compressor trip requiring going to circulation  
 Loss/failure of stabilizer overhead exchanger, PSV lifts & HCs goes to atmosphere  
These examples also illustrate the range of what scenarios for different plants, process areas, and 
spans of control, that could be generated and/or analyzed at the workshop sessions. 
Scenarios are then defined in terms of the team goal(s), operations roles required, each role’s 
tasks, time requirements of each tasks, communication and collaboration requirements between 
roles, hazards, impacts, and improvement opportunities.  
The purpose of the scenario analysis is to identify  
 any gaps in personnel coverage of the activities required  
 opportunities for improvements in areas such as procedures, training, unit monitoring 
tools and techniques, and controls 
 hazards to the team or risks to successfully managing the abnormal event  
The resulting workflow map (i.e., timeline indicating a ‘successful’ response to a given scenario) 
should NOT be taken as a guarantee that all operations teams would always be able to respond 
successfully to the initiating event and assumptions characterizing a given scenario. All possible 
conditions, circumstances, and possible combination of influences cannot be anticipated in the 
workshop setting. However, the analysis should identify potential subjective risks that the SMEs 
could reasonably be expected to recognize as a result of completing the workshop. 
  
The table below summarizes the various symbols used to depict different types of actions taken 
during the scenario (workflow map).  
Scenario Action Action Description  
 
A brief description of the initiating event or early warning 
sign  
 
A monitoring action, typically performed by the console 
operator via the HMI operating displays or other automation 
tool  
 
A control action performed by the console operator via the 
HMI, be it a set point change, valve position adjustment, or 
other action via the control system 
 
A radio or telephone communication initiated by the 
operations team member whose ‘lane’ contains it  
 
An action performed by one or more unit operators in the 
field  
 
An decision point in the scenario that must be made and may 
cause a ‘branched’ response, depending on the resulting 
decision  
 
A Safety System-initiated action performed automatically by 
the automation itself  
 
An indication that one or more unit operators must physically 
move between areas or equipment locations before 
performing the next field action  
 
An improvement recommendation identified by either the 
participants or facilitator, during the process of creating the 
process map timeline  
If an action has an extended duration, then this additional time is qualitatively represented by a 
longer (i.e., ‘stretched’ shape). In other instances, an action may be performed continuously—or 
may need to be performed one or more times throughout the scenario—in which case the symbol 
is also stretched out over the respective qualitative timeframe. Where more than one role is 
required for a task, that task is drawn to span the required roles.  
3 SBRA for Abnormal Event Analysis Examples 
Figure 2 depicts typical results expected from a SBRA Abnormal Event Analysis. The figure 
utilizes a “swim-lane” workflow map for the scenarios analyzed. The swim lanes correspond to 
each role or member of the operations team (e.g., supervisor, console operator, and field 
operators) involved in dealing with the scenario. 
The scenario mapped out in Figure 2 depicted the actions SMEs identified in an event in which a 
HTU upset caused a loss of feed to its downstream FCCU.  The operating team’s goals in this 
scenario were first to cut their HTU and FCCU run rates, then to bypass the HTU to enable the 
FCCU to take “colder” feed directly from the Crude unit—because the run from Crude was 
approximately 350 F, whereas tank temperatures would be at ambient, which is hard on the 
FCCU heaters—to keep the FCCU from having to shut down completely. The challenge was that 













capacity could only provide the team with sufficient feed to keep running at reduced rates for 
about 5 to 10 minutes. 
Figure 2: HTU loss of feed to FCCU example  
 
As it turns out, not only were opportunities identified to reduce the overall time to put the bypass 
in place by installing motor-operated valves controlled from the DCS, but one team of console 
operators had also worked out a solution for buying the additional time needed within their own 
shift team.  
Their shift team’s solution was as follows: The HTU stripper tower (the last piece of equipment 
in the Hydrotreater unit the feed leaves before heading to the FCCU charge drum) was always 
kept at a fairly high level. When the HTU shut down, the valve allowing the flow from the 
stripper to the FCCU charge drum closed automatically to maintain level in the stripper.  
However, because of its size, the operators had determined that by occasionally cutting the level 
in the Stripper by 5%, they could in turn keep filling the FCCU feed drum, and buy the FCCU 
team the time needed to put the bypass in place to enable them to run on the feed from the Crude 
unit.  
As a result, the plant decided that this solution should be documented in a procedure, and all of 
their console operators should be trained on its execution. 
  
The table below summaries the findings and recommendations: 
Scenario Description Loss of HTU feed 
Causes  FCCU direct feed from the HTU; Loss can happen immediately 
 The FCCU charge drum size was not big enough  
 Not enough physical space for a larger drum to be installed  
Early warning signs  Only advanced warning for FCCU console operator would be 
verbal from HTU console operator 
 If the level in HTU hot flash drum bounced, then the SIS took 
over and cut feed 
Potential impacts   If the team could not drop 10,000bbl in 4 minutes, then the 
FCCU was going to trip  
 If HTU console operator did not know to help the FCCU console 
operator, the FCCU would go down hard, rather than a graceful 
cutback  
 On the FCCU side, if the charge drum level drops fast – faster 
than the field make-up valve can be manually opened, the FCCU 
trips; Cold make-up feed will hit FCCU heater hard (and max 
out on high gas pressure) 
Operating team goals  Cut back rates 
 Cut level in HTU Stripper by 5%, this will fill the FCCU feed 
drum quickly; and buy the FCCU time to set up the run from the 
Crude unit; the HTU Stripper level cut can be done for 
approximately 30 minutes probably and help limp the FCCU 
through the HTU loss 
 Line-up direct feed from Crude unit (Crude is 350 F) minimizing 
impact to heaters from cold feed ex tankage 
 Line-up takes time to switch to Crude feed / supplement feed 
from HTU stripper  
Scenario Roles and 
Responsibilities 
 FCCU console operator reduces feed/monitors bypass progress  
 HTU console operator secures HTU and reduces stripper level as 
required to feed FCCU 
 Field operator (1) goes to assist at HTU board by monitoring 
non-critical areas (additional units in span of control) 
 FO (2) goes to assist with crude bypass setup 
 FO (3) works with HTU board to monitor and control lower 
rates 
Risks / Improvement 
Recommendations 
 Limited knowledge by all operators and operations specialists of 
HTU stripper level reduction process for FCCU 
 Provide training, reduce HTU Stripper level by 5%, which will 
fill the FCCU feed drum quickly; and buy the FCCU time to 
line-up from the Crude unit; This HTU Stripper level reduction 
can be done for ~30 minutes enough time for line-up to FCCU 
 Create procedure for the HTU Board on how to protect the 
FCCU with this Stripper level cut 
Figure 3 depict the results from the analysis of “Loss of Hydraulic Oil” scenario for a FCCU (as 
taken from the example scenario list) at a different refinery.  
Figure 3: Loss of Hydraulic Oil scenario example for a FCCU  
 
The scenario mapped out in Figure 2 above describes the actions operators took for the scenario 
for a loss of hydraulic oil (system) within an FCCU. The operating team’s goals in this scenario 
were to restore hydraulic oil pressure while maintaining control of the reactor-regenerator 
pressure differential and subsequently preventing the likelihood of a flow reversal. In this 
particular scenario, one field operator was required fulltime to manually control RX/Regen 
pressure (the valve is located on the twelve level of the Regenerator structure with stair-access 
only), under these conditions only one field operator remained available to perform all other 











































Get low pressure on 
hyd. oil
Ask RT to 




Checks hyd. Oil 
pumps 
~ ? Min.
Attempt a restart 
on one of the 
pumps
Time-imperative is a function of 
current rates and current unit 
steady-state; likely will have some 
time to get out and check pumps
If can’t start pumps, 
send RTs to valves
On the Move
to Stack SVVs
Manually controlling Stack valves
While air blower is online, RT is at 
stack valves
Controlled trip?
Same actions as mapped before, 
but one man down
If D RT is not trained on SVVs, the C 
and D RTs need to go to Stack SVVs 
together, D RT shows C RT what to do 
as directed by Console RT
Will change time significantly
Shut down feed pump 
& spare/ Line up torch 
oil (manifold at unit 
limits)




Trip pumps as coming 
back from feed pumps 
(APS too)
Two Feed nozzles 
isolated ~X min
(time imperative)
Field check / Close regen 
cat isolation slide valve
~5 min. (time imperative)
Up to Top to isolate 
quench to reactor
Vent feed train & 
check CSC s/d valve
Field check / Close spent cat isolation 
slide valve
~5 min. (time imperative)
Shutdown sponge oil 
& crack open fuel gas 
on Frac
Guiding field RT to reverse 
differentials on Rx and Regen 
Push buttons to trip (feed out, 
slide valves, bypass boiler)
If send 5 minutes trying to restart 
pumps, if SVVs are moving, may 
be losing accumulator pressure 






The table below summaries the findings and recommendations: 
Scenario Description Loss of hydraulic oil  
 Electric pump fails/ spare does not start 
 Lose oil to two SVV (accumulators on Spent Cat and 
Regen SVV, but after time will lose) and the two Stack 
SVVs (no accumulators – lose control on those; in static 
position)[DCR1] 
 A person could be needed at each valve (three persons, and 
there are only two field operators and if both are on the 
structure, then no one is on the ground in case of other ‘time-
critical’ tasks arise) 
Causes  Two pumps have failed 
 Substantial leak in system 
 Plugged filters 
Early warning signs  Low discharge pressure alarm on oil system 
 Low level alarm on oil drum before get pressure alarm 
perhaps 
 Plugged filters – can see on trends 
Potential impacts   Ability to control Stack valves and Regen / Reactor SVVs  
 Potential for reversal (if can’t restore hydraulic oil pressure)  
 Follow-up impact might be to pull feed 
 To other areas - None initially 
Operating team goals  Restore pressure on hydraulic oil system  
 Restore some control on for pressure on Regen / differential 
across SVV  
 Prevent likelihood of reversal (have lost pressure control)  
Risks  Loss of pressure control 
 Flow reversals 
 Environmental 
 Negated CSC coverage with loss of SV 
Improvement 
Recommendations 
 There was a field action to go “Up Top to isolate quench to 
reactors”. Given the physical distance – and the typical 
location of this field action in the sequence – a feasibility and 
cost-benefit study of an automated control valve, DCS-
initiated isolation valve, or comparable solution should be 
considered.  
 There was a field action “Two feed nozzles isolated” that is 
noted as “time imperative”. Given the time imperative nature 
of the action – and the typical location of this field action in 
the sequence – a feasibility and cost-benefit study of an 
automated control valve, DCS-initiated isolation valve, or 
comparable solution should be considered.  
4 Summary 
The SBRA methodology for abnormal operating events has been designed to capture and analyze 
the collaborative activities or simultaneous actions, span of control interdependency and 
teamwork that are essential to ensure an effective AEM outcome. Moreover, the workflow map 
itself is an effective tool for documenting the knowledge captured for each individual scenario 
analyzed in the workshop sessions. The SBRA process for abnormal events should be regularly 
conducted similarly to other risk assessment tools within a process safety management 
framework. 
The key benefits: 
 Capture and share individual knowledge/experiences of abnormal and emergency 
event(s) 
 Establish a shared understanding of goals, roles, responsibilities, and risks during 
different abnormal events  
 Identify operations resource requirements 
 Identify hazards or potential risks and develop mitigation strategies 
 Build team competencies and task interdependence 
 Proactively establish team goals 
 Verify and validate existing plant emergency procedure and/or work practices 
 Establish span-of-control (multi-plant) priorities, e.g. prioritize the order in which 
furnaces are shut-down across a single console operator’s span-of-control during certain 
abnormal events 
 Integrate learnings into training program e.g. incorporate the SBRA tool for abnormal 
event(s) outcomes into abnormal/emergency response exercises 
 Identify potentially different goals and response strategies across shift teams  
 
Tell me and I’ll forget. 
Show me and I may remember. 
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